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Abstract
We consider a discrete time financial market with proportional transaction costs under model
uncertainty, and study a nume´raire-based semi-static utility maximization problem with an
exponential utility preference. The randomization techniques recently developed in [14] allow
us to transform the original problem into a frictionless counterpart on an enlarged space. By
suggesting a different dynamic programming argument than in [3], we are able to prove the
existence of the optimal strategy and the convex duality theorem in our context with transaction
costs. In the frictionless framework, this alternative dynamic programming argument also allows
us to generalize the main results in [3] to a weaker market condition. Moreover, as an application
of the duality representation, some basic features of utility indifference prices are investigated
in our robust setting with transaction costs.
Key words. Utility maximization, transaction costs, model uncertainty, randomization method,
convex duality, utility indifference pricing.
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1 Introduction
The optimal investment via utility maximization has always been one of the fundamental prob-
lems in quantitative finance. In particular, the optimal semi-static portfolio among risky assets
and liquid options and the associated utility indifference pricing of unhedgeable illiquid con-
tingent claims have attracted a lot of research interests recently. In the classical dominated
market model, the so-called utility maximization with random endowments was extensively in-
vestigated, see among [34], [22], [25], [23], [9] and [32]. In particular, the duality approach has
been proposed and developed as a powerful tool to deal with general incomplete market mod-
els. Without knowing the specific underlying model structures, the convex duality relationship
enables one to obtain the existence of the primal optimizer by solving the corresponding dual
optimization problem first. Typically, the dual problem is formulated on the set of equivalent
(local) martingale measures (EMM), whose existence is ensured by some appropriate no arbi-
trage assumptions. Depending on the domain of the utility function, different techniques are
involved in order to obtain some convex duality results. For utilities defined on the positive real
line, to handle the random payoffs and to establish the bipolar relationship, the appropriate
closure of the dual set of EMM plays the key role, see [22] and [25] for instance. On the other
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hand, for utilities defined on the whole real line, a subset of EMM with finite general entropy is
usually chosen to define the dual problem while the appropriate definition of working portfolios
turns out to be critical to guarantee and relate the primal and dual optimizers, see [23], [9] and
[32] and the references therein.
Because of the growing complexity of real financial markets, the aforementioned optimiza-
tion problems have been actively extended mainly in two directions. The first fruitful extension
incorporates the practical trading frictions, namely transaction costs, into decision making and
the resulting wealth process. As transaction costs will generically break the (local) martingale
property of the self-financing wealth process under EMM, the dual pricing kernel is not ex-
pected to be the same as in the frictionless counterpart. Instead, the no-arbitrage condition is
closely related to the existence of a pair of dual elements named the consistent price system
(CPS). Briefly speaking, the first component of CPS is a process evolving inside the bid-ask
spread, while the second component is an equivalent probability measure under which the first
component becomes a martingale. However, similar to the case in the frictionless model, for
utility maximization with random endowments, the set of CPS can only serve as the first step to
formulate the naive dual problem. More efforts are demanded to deal with the random payoffs
from options, see some related work in [10], [36], [29] and [6].
The second compelling extension in the literature is to take into account the model uncer-
tainty, for instance the volatility uncertainty, by starting with a set of possibly mutually singular
probability measures. Namely, different probability measures describe the believes of different
investors on the market. In the discrete time framework, the no-arbitrage condition and the
fundamental theorem in robust finance have been essentially studied in [1, 15, 19, 18], etc. for
frictionless markets, and in [24, 7, 16, 17, 20] for market with transaction costs. Analogous to
the dominated case, the pricing-hedging duality can usually be obtained by studying the super-
hedging problem under some appropriate no-arbitrage conditions. The non-dominated robust
utility maximization in the discrete time frictionless market was first examined by [31], where
the dynamic programming principle plays the major role to derive the existence of the optimal
primal strategy without passing to the dual problem, see some further extensions in [30, 12, 13].
In a context where the model uncertainty is represented by a collection of stochastic processes,
[33] proved the existence of the optimal strategy for the utility function defined either over the
positive or over the whole real line. However, whether the convex duality holds remained open
in these pioneer work of utility maximization. Recently, [3] established the duality represen-
tation for the exponential utility preference in the frictionless model under some restrictive no
arbitrage conditions, which motivates us to reconsider the validity of duality theorem in this
paper with proportional transaction costs under weaker market conditions using some distinc-
tive arguments. We also note a recent paper [4], in which the authors proved a robust utility
maximization duality using medial limits and a functional version of Choquet’s capacitability
theorem.
The main objective of this paper is therefore to study the existence of the optimal strategy,
the convex duality theorem and the auxiliary dynamic programming principle for a semi-static
utility maximization problem with transaction costs in a discrete time framework. To be precise,
we envision an investor who chooses the optimal semi-static portfolio in stocks and liquid options
with an extra random endowment for the case of exponential utility preference and meanwhile
each trading incurs proportional transaction fees. The core idea of our analysis is to reduce the
complexity of transaction costs significantly by employing the randomization method as in [14].
Consequently, the unpleasant mathematical obstacles caused by trading fees can be hidden in
an enlarged space with additional randomness and some techniques in the literature of robust
hedging and utility maximization in frictionless models can be modified and adopted. It is worth
noting that by applying the randomization approach in [14] but with a different and more in-
volved definition of family of probability measures on the enlarged space, [5] recently established
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a super-replication duality with transaction cost under a weaker no-arbitrage condition.
Our main contributions are the following. First, we develop a distinctive dynamic pro-
gramming argument comparing to [3] in a frictionless market. This allows us to overcome a
measurability difficulty in [3] and hence generalize their main results (duality and existence)
under a weaker market condition. This generalization is presented in Appendix. Secondly, we
generalize the randomization technique in [14] in this utility maximization problem, which re-
lies essentially on a minimax argument to resolve a filtration enlargement problem. While the
corresponding convex/concave property is quite natural for the super-replication problem in
[14], it is much less obvious for the utility maximization problem and we use a log transforma-
tion technique in this exponential utility maximization problem. Finally, to manifest the value
of the duality representation, we also investigate an application to utility indifference pricing.
Several fundamental properties of indifference prices including the asymptotic convergence of
indifference prices to the superhedging price and some continuity results with respect to random
endowments are confirmed in the robust setting with transaction costs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the market model
with transaction costs, and show how to reformulate the robust utility maximization problem
on a frictionless market on an enlarged space using the randomization method. In Section 3,
we restrict to the case of the exponential utility preference. A convex duality theorem and
the existence of the optimal trading strategy are first obtained in the presence of both model
uncertainty and transaction costs. As an application, several properties of the utility indifference
prices are concluded. Section 4 mainly provides the proof of the duality result using a dynamic
programming argument.
Notation. Given a measurable space (Ω,F), we denote by B(Ω,F) the set of all probability
measures on (Ω,F). For a topological space Ω, B(Ω) denotes its Borel σ-field with the abbreviate
notation B(Ω) := B(Ω,B(Ω)). For a Polish space Ω, a subset A ⊆ Ω is called analytic if it
is the image of a Borel subset of another Polish space under a Borel measurable mapping. A
function f : Ω → R := [−∞,∞] is upper semianalytic if {ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) > a} is analytic for all
a ∈ R. Given a probability measure P ∈ B(Ω) and a measurable function f : Ω→ R, we define
the expectation
EP[f ] := EP[f+]− EP[f−], with the convention ∞−∞ = −∞.
For a family P ⊆ B(Ω) of probability measures, a subset A ⊂ Ω is called P-polar if A ⊂ A′
for some universally measurable set A′ satisfying P[A′] = 0 for all P ∈ P , and a property is
said to hold P-quasi surely or P-q.s if it holds true outside a P-polar set. For Q ∈ B(Ω), we
write Q≪ P if there exists P′ ∈ P such that Q≪ P′. Given a sigma algebra G, we denote by
L0(G) the collection of Rd-valued random variable that are G-measurable, d being given by the
context.
2 Market model and Problem Formulation
We first introduce a financial market with proportional transaction costs in a multivariate setting
under model uncertainty. A utility maximization problem is formulated afterwards and we then
reformulate the problem further in a frictionless market setting on an enlarged space. Although
the reformulation technique can be used for a more general framework, we will stay essentially
in the context of Bouchard and Nutz [15, 16].
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2.1 Market model and preliminaries
A product space with a set of probability measures Let Ω0 := {ω0} be a singleton
and Ω1 be a Polish space. For each t = 1, · · · , T , we denote by Ωt := Ωt1 the t-fold Cartesian
product of Ω1 and let F0t := B(Ωt) and Ft its universal completion. In particular, F0 is trivial.
We define the filtered measurable space (Ω,F) by
Ω := ΩT , F := FT , F := (Ft)0≤t≤T and F
0 := (F0t )0≤t≤T .
Let us then introduce a set P of probability measures on (Ω,F) by
P :=
{
P := P0 ⊗ P1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ PT−1 : Pt(·) ∈ Pt(·) for t ≤ T − 1
}
. (2.1)
In the definition above, Pt : Ωt 7→ B(Ω1) are probability kernels such that the probability
measure P is defined by Fubini’s theorem in the sense that
P(A) :=
∫
Ω1
· · ·
∫
Ω1
1A(ω1, ω2 · · · , ωT )PT−1(ω1, · · · , ωT−1; dωT ) · · ·P0(dω1),
and Pt(ω) is a non-empty convex set in B(Ω1), which represents the set of all possible models
for the (t+ 1)-th period, given the state ω ∈ Ωt at time t = 0, 1 · · · , T − 1. As in the literature,
we assume that, for each t,
[[Pt]] :=
{
(ω,P) : ω ∈ Ωt,P ∈ Pt(ω)
}
⊆ Ωt × P(Ω1) is analytic. (2.2)
This ensures in particular that P in (2.1) is nonempty.
A financial market with proportional transaction cost The financial market with
proportional transaction cost is formulated in terms of random cones. Let d ≥ 2, for every
t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , T }, Kt : Ω → 2R
d
is a F0t -measurable random set in the sense that {ω ∈ Ω :
Kt(ω) ∩ O 6= ∅} ∈ F0t for every closed (open) set O ⊂ R
d. Here, for each ω ∈ Ω, Kt(ω) is a
closed convex cone containing Rd+, called the solvency cone at time t. It represents the collection
of positions, labelled in units of different d financial assets, that can be turned into non-negative
ones (component by component) by performing immediately exchanges between the assets. We
denote by K∗t ⊂ R
d
+ its (nonnegative) dual cone:
K∗t (ω) :=
{
y ∈ Rd : x · y ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Kt(ω)
}
, (2.3)
where x · y :=
∑d
i=1 x
iyi is the inner product on Rd. For later use, let us also introduce
K∗,0t (ω) :=
{
y = (y1, · · · , yd) ∈ K∗t (ω), y
d = 1
}
.
As in [16], we assume the following conditions throughout the paper:
Assumption 2.1. K∗t ∩ ∂R
d
+ = {0} and intK
∗
t (ω) 6= ∅ for every ω ∈ Ω and t ≤ T .
It follows from the above assumption and [16, Lemma A.1] that K∗t , K
∗,0
t and intK
∗
t are all
F0t -measurable. Moreover, there is a F
0-adapted process S satisfying
St(ω) ∈ K
∗,0
t (ω) ∩ intK
∗
t (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω, t ≤ T . (2.4)
We also assume that transaction costs are bounded and uniformly strictly positive. This is
formulated in terms of S above.
Assumption 2.2. There is some constant c > 1 such that
c−1Sit(ω) ≤ y
i ≤ cSit(ω), for every i ≤ d− 1 and y ∈ K
∗,0
t (ω).
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Finally, we define the collection of admissible strategies as follows.
Definition 2.3. We say that an F-adapted process η = (ηt)0≤t≤T is an admissible trading
strategy if
ηt ∈ −Kt P-q.s. for all t ≤ T .
We denote by A the collection of all admissible strategies.
The constraint ηt ∈ −Kt means that 0− ηt ∈ Kt, i.e., starting at t with 0, one can perform
immediate transfers to reach the position ηt. Then, given η ∈ A, the corresponding wealth
process associated to a zero initial endowment at time 0 is
(∑t
s=0 ηs
)
t≤T
. We can refer to
[14, 16] for concrete examples. See also the monograph [27].
2.2 A utility maximization problem and its reformulation
Let U : R → R ∪ {−∞} be a non-decreasing concave utility function. We are interested in the
following robust utility maximization problem with random endowments:
V (ξ) := sup
η∈A0
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
((
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
, (2.5)
where A0 denotes the collection of all η ∈ A such that (ξ +
∑T
t=0 ηt)
i = 0 for i = 1, · · · , d− 1.
Remark 2.4. Note that (2.5) is a nume´raire based utility maximization problem, and the d-th
asset plays the role of the nume´raire. For an admissible strategy in A0, it is required to liquidate
the position of all other assets for i = 1, · · · , d− 1 at the terminal time T .
The mixture of model uncertainty, transaction costs and random endowments can bring a
lot of new mathematical challenges. Our paramount remedy to reduce the complexity is to
reformulate it on a fictitious market without transaction cost. In particular, this allows us to
use some well known results and techniques in the existing literature.
A frictionless market on the enlarged space Given the constant c > 1 in Assumption
2.2, we define Λ1 := [c
−1, c]d−1 and Λ := (Λ1)
T+1, and then introduce the canonical process
Θt(θ) := θt, ∀θ = (θt)t≤T ∈ Λ, as well as the σ-fields FΛt := σ(Θs, s ≤ t), t ≤ T . We next
introduce an enlarged space Ω := Ω× Λ, an enlarged σ-field F := F ⊗FΛT , together with three
filtrations F
0
= (F
0
t )0≤t≤T , F˜ = (F˜t)0≤t≤T and F = (F t)0≤t≤T in which F
0
t := F
0
t ⊗ F
Λ
t ,
F˜t := Ft ⊗ {∅,Λ} and F t := Ft ⊗FΛt for t ≤ T .
Next, let us introduce our randomized market model with the fictitious underlying stock
X = (Xt)0≤t≤T defined by
Xt(ω¯) := ΠK∗,0t (ω)
[St(ω)θt], for all ω¯ = (ω, θ) ∈ Ω, t ≤ T, (2.6)
where St(ω)θt := (S
1
t (ω)θ
1
t , · · · , S
d−1
t (ω)θ
d−1
t , S
d
t (ω)), and ΠK∗,0t (ω)
[y] stands for the projection
of y ∈ Rd on the convex closed set K∗,0t (ω). It is worth noting that St ∈ K
∗,0
t for t ≤ T and
that X is F
0
-adapted by Lemma 2.6 of [14].
We then define two sets of strategy processes by
H := {All F˜-predictable processes} and H := {All F-predictable processes}.
Notice that F˜t := Ft ⊗ {∅,Λ}, and hence a F˜-predictable process can be identified to be a F-
predictable process. Given a strategyH ∈ H, the resulting wealth process is given by (H◦X)t :=∑t
s=1Hs · (Xs −Xs−1), t ≤ T .
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Finally, let us introduce some sets of probability measures on the enlarged space (Ω,F). Let
P :=
{
P ∈ B(Ω,F) such that P|Ω ∈ P
}
.
We next introduce a subset P int ⊂ P as follows. Recall that Ω has a product structure as Ω.
More precisely, for a fixed t ≤ T , let Ω0 := Ω0 × Λ1, Ωt := Ω0 × (Ω1 × Λ1)t and Ω := Ω× Λ =
ΩT . For (ω = (ω0, · · · , ωT ), θ = (θ0, · · · , θT )) ∈ Ω and t ≤ T , we denote ωt := (ω0, · · · , ωt),
θt := (θ0, · · · , θt) and ω¯t := (ωt, θt).
• For t = 0, 1, · · · , T − 1 and ω¯ = (ω, θ) ∈ Ωt, we define P(t, ω¯) :=
{
P ∈ B(Ω1 × Λ1) :
P|Ω1 ∈ Pt(ω)
}
, and
P int(t, ω¯) :=
{
P ∈ P(t, ω¯) : δω¯ ⊗ P[Xt+1 ∈ intK
∗
t+1] = 1
}
, (2.7)
where δω¯ ⊗ P is a probability measure on Ωt+1 = Ωt × (Ω1 × Λ1) and Xt+1 (defined in
(2.6)) is considered as a random variable defined on Ωt+1.
• Let P int,∅ be the collection of all probability measures P on Ω0 such that P[X0 ∈ intK
∗
0 ] = 1.
We define
P int :=
{
P∅ ⊗ P0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ PT−1 : P∅ ∈ P int,∅ and Pt(·) ∈ P int(t, ·) for t ≤ T − 1
}
,
where Pt(·) is a universally measurable selector of P int(t, ·).
Remark 2.5. Assume that the analyticity condition (2.2) for [[Pt]] holds, Lemma 2.13 of [14]
asserts that [[
P int(t)
]]
:=
{
(ω¯,P) : ω¯ ∈ Ωt,P ∈ P int(t, ω¯)
}
is also analytic,
which in particular ensures that P int is nonempty.
Reformulation on the enlarged space We now reformulate the utility maximization
(2.5) on the enlarged space Ω using the underlying stock X . Let us set
g(ω¯) := ξ(ω) ·XT (ω¯), for all ω¯ = (ω, θ) ∈ Ω,
as the contingent claim.
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold, then
V (ξ) = sup
H∈H
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
= sup
H∈H
inf
P∈Pint
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
.
Proof. To simplify the notation, let us write ∆Xt := Xt − Xt−1. We shall follow closely the
arguments in Proposition 3.3 of [14].
Step 1 : Fix η ∈ A0 and define the F˜-predictable process H by Ht :=
∑t
s=1∆Hs with ∆Ht :=
ηt−1 for t = 1, · · · , T . By rearranging all terms, we have(
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d
=
(
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)
·XT =
T∑
t=1
Ht ·∆Xt +
T∑
t=0
ηt ·Xt + g ≤
T∑
t=1
Ht ·∆Xt + g,
where the last inequality follows by the fact that ηt ∈ −Kt and hence ηt · Xt ≤ 0. As U is
non-decreasing, it follows that
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
((
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
≤ inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
,
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which yields that
V (ξ) ≤ sup
H∈H
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
.
By the same argument using P int to replace P , we can similarly obtain the inequality
V (ξ) ≤ sup
H∈H
inf
P∈Pint
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
.
Step 2 : To prove the reverse inequality, we fix H ∈ H. Define η = (ηt)0≤t≤T by η
i
t := ∆H
i
t+1,
t ≤ T − 1 and ηiT := −ξ
i −
∑T−1
s=0 η
i
s for i ≤ d− 1, and
ηdt (ω) := inf
θ∈Λ
mdt (ω, θ) with m
d
t (ω¯) := −
d−1∑
i=1
ηit(ω)X
i
t(ω¯), t ≤ T. (2.8)
for all ω¯ = (ω, θ) ∈ Ω. As mdt (ω, θ) is bounded and continuous in θ, η
d
t is Ft-measurable by
the Measurable Maximum Theorem (see e.g. Theorem 18.19 of [2]). From the construction, we
know η ∈ A0. Thus we have
inf
θ∈Λ
(
(H ◦X)T + g
)
(·, θ) = inf
θ∈Λ
{( T∑
t=0
ηt + ξ
)
·XT −
T−1∑
t=0
ηt ·Xt
}
(·, θ)
= inf
θ∈Λ
{( T∑
t=0
ηt + ξ
)
·XT
}
(·, θ)−
T−1∑
t=0
sup
θ∈Λ
{
ηt ·Xt
}
(·, θ).
= inf
θ∈Λ
{( T∑
t=0
ηt + ξ
)
·XT
}
(·, θ) =
(
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d
, (2.9)
where in the second equality we exchange the the infimum and the summation, because each
Xt depends on θ only through θt for t = 0, · · · , T . Let ε > 0, we can use a measurable
selection argument (see e.g. Proposition 7.50 of [11]) to choose a universally measurable map
ω ∈ Ω 7→ θε(ω) ∈ Λ such that, for all ω ∈ Ω, one has
U
((
H ◦X
)
T
(
ω, θε(ω)
)
+ g(ω, θε(ω))
)
≤ inf
θ∈Λ
U
((
H ◦X
)
T
(ω, θ) + g(ω, θ)
)
+ ε,
where the r.h.s. term is a universally measurable random variable defined on Ω. Then given
P ∈ P , one defines Pε := P ◦ (ω, θε(ω))
−1 ∈ P and obtains
EPε
[
U
(
(H ◦X)T + g
)]
≤ EP
[
inf
θ∈Λ
U
((
H ◦X
)
T
(·, θ) + g(·, θ)
)]
+ ε.
By arbitrariness of ε > 0 and the fact that Pε ∈ P, it follows that
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
(H ◦X)T + g
)]
≤ inf
P∈P
EP
[
inf
θ∈Λ
U
(
(H ◦X)T (·, θ) + g(·, θ)
)]
(2.10)
= inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
inf
θ∈Λ
[
(H ◦X)T (·, θ) + g(·, θ)
])]
= inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
((
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
.
This leads to
sup
H∈H
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
≤ V (ξ),
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and hence we have the desired equality.
Step 3 : For the case with P int in place of P, it is enough to notice as in Step 2 that
inf
θ∈Λint(·)
[
(H ◦X)T (·, θ) + g(·, θ)
]
=
(
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d
,
where Λint(ω) is defined as the collection of θ ∈ Λ such that St(ω)θt ∈ intK
∗
t (ω).
Next, for each θ ∈ Λ, we define Aθt (ω) := ∅ for s 6= t and A
θ
t (ω) := {St(ω)θt ∈ intK
∗
t (ω)}.
Note that ω 7→ intK∗t (ω) is F
0
t -measurable. Then
{
(ω, y) ∈ Ωt × R : St(ω)θt = y and y ∈
intK∗t (ω)
}
is a Borel set and hence ω 7→ 1Aθt (ω) is a universally measurable map. We then define
the universally measurable probability kernels by
qθt : ω ∈ Ω 7→ q
θ
t (·|ω) := δθt1Aθt (ω) + δ11(Aθt (ω))c ∈ B(Λ1), t ≤ T, (2.11)
where 1 is the vector of Rd with all entries equal to 1, and B(Λ1) denotes the collection of all
Borel probability measures on Λ1.
It follows that P⊗ (qθ0 ⊗ q
θ
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ q
θ
T ) ∈ P int for every P ∈ P . Then it suffices to argue as
in Step 2 above to obtain that
inf
P∈Pint
EP
[
U
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
≤ inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
(
inf
θ∈Λint(·)
(
(H ◦X)T (·, θ) + g(·, θ)
))]
= inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
((
ξ +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
,
and we hence conclude as in Step 2.
2.3 The robust no-arbitrage condition of Bouchard and Nutz
To conclude, we will discuss the no-arbitrage condition on Ω and its link to that on the enlarged
space Ω.
Definition 2.7. (i)We say the robust no-arbitrage condition of second kind NA2(P) on Ω holds
true if for all t ≤ T − 1 and all ξ ∈ L0(Ft),
ξ ∈ Kt+1 P-q.s. implies ξ ∈ Kt P-q.s.
(ii) Let (Q, Z) be a couple where Q ∈ B(Ω) and Z = (Zt)t=0,··· ,T an adapted process, (Q, Z) is
called a strict consistent price system (SCPS) if Q≪ P, Zt ∈ intK∗t Q-a.s. for all t = 0, · · · , T
and Z is a Q-martingale.
We denote by S the collection of all SCPS, and also denote the subset
S0 :=
{
(Q, Z) ∈ S such that Zd ≡ 1
}
. (2.12)
Remark 2.8. As stated in the fundamental theorem of asset pricing proved in [16] (see also
[7, 8]), the no-arbitrage condition NA2(P) is equivalent to: for all t ≤ T − 1, P ∈ P and Ft-
random variable Y taking value in intK∗t , there exists a SCPS (Q, Z) such that P≪ Q, P = Q
on Ft and Y = Zt P-a.s..
On the enlarged space Ω, we also follow [15] to introduce a notion of the robust no-arbitrage
condition.
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Definition 2.9. We say that the robust no-arbitrage condition NA(P int) on Ω holds true if, for
every H ∈ H,
(H ◦X)T ≥ 0, P int-q.s. =⇒ (H ◦X)T = 0, P int-q.s.
Remark 2.10. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing in [15] proves that the condition
NA(P int) (resp. NA(P) ) is equivalent to : for all P ∈ P int (resp. P ), there exists Q ∈ B(Ω)
such that P≪ Q≪ P int (resp. P ) and X is an (F,Q)-martingale.
Hereafter, we denote by Q0 the collection of measures Q ∈ B(Ω) such that Q≪ P int and
X is an (F,Q)-martingale. The above two no-arbitrage conditions on Ω and on Ω are related
by Proposition 2.16 of [14], that we recall as below.
Proposition 2.11. The condition NA2(P) on Ω is equivalent to the condition NA(P int) on Ω.
3 Exponential utility maximization
Starting from this section, we will restrict ourselves to the case of the exponential utility function,
i.e.,
U(x) := −exp(−γx), for some constant γ > 0,
and provide a detailed study on the corresponding utility maximization problem.
We will consider a general context, where one is allowed to trade some liquid options statically
at the initial time whose payoffs would also contribute to the terminal wealth. Namely, for
e ∈ N ∪ {0}, there are a finite class of F0T -measurable random vectors ζi : Ω→ R
d, i = 1, · · · , e,
where each ζi represents the payoff of some option i labeled in units of d risky assets. Let
ξ : Ω → Rd represent the payoff of the random endowment, then our maximization problem is
given by.
V (ξ, γ) := sup
(ℓ,η)∈Ae
inf
P∈P
EP
[
U
((
ξ +
e∑
i=1
(
ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d
)
+
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
. (3.13)
where 1d is the vector with all components equal to 0 but the last one that is equal to 1 and Ae
denotes the collection of all (l, η) ∈ Re ×A such that ξ +
∑e
i=1
(
ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d
)
+
∑T
t=0 ηt
)i
= 0
for i = 1, · · · , d − 1. In above, we write γ in V (ξ, γ) to emphasize the dependence of value in
parameter γ in the utility function U . Also, each static option ζi has price 0, but the static
trading induces the proportional transaction cost with rate ci > 0.
3.1 The convex duality result
In the robust frictionless setting, the same exponential utility maximization problem has been
studied by Bartl [3], in which a convex duality theorem has been established. Here, we apply and
generalize their results in our context with transaction costs under weaker market conditions.
Let us introduce a robust version of the relative entropy associated to a probability measure
Q as
E(Q,P) := inf
P∈P
E(Q,P), where E(Q,P) :=
{
EP
[
dQ
dP log
dQ
dP
]
, if Q≪ P,
+∞, otherwise.
(3.14)
Note that S0 is a subset of the collection of SCPS (Q, Z) defined in (2.12), we then define
S∗e :=
{
(Q, Z) ∈ S0 : E
Q
[
(ξ · ZT )−
]
+E(Q,P) < +∞ and EQ
[
ζi · ZT
]
∈ [−ci, ci], i = 1,· · ·, e
}
.
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Theorem 3.1. Let ξ and (ζi)i≤e: Ω→ Rd be Borel measurable and assume that NA2(P) holds.
Assume either that e = 0, or that e ≥ 1 and for all ℓ ∈ Re and η ∈ A,
e∑
i=1
(
ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d
)
+
T∑
t=0
ηt ∈ KT P-q.s. =⇒ ℓ = 0. (3.15)
Then, we have
V (ξ, γ) = − exp
(
− inf
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
γξ · ZT
]
+ E(Q,P)
})
, (3.16)
Moreover, the infimum over (ℓ, η) ∈ Ae is attained by an optimal strategy (ℓˆ, ηˆ).
Remark 3.2. Note that up to taking logarithm on both sides and replacing γξ by −ξ, the equality
(3.16) is equivalent to
inf
(ℓ,η)∈Ae
sup
P∈P
logEP
exp
(ξ − e∑
i=1
(ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d)−
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d
= sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− E(Q,P)
}
.
(3.17)
Remark 3.3. When e ≥ 1, ζi is considered as statically traded options and ci > 0 is the
corresponding proportional transaction cost, then the condition (3.15) should be understood as a
kind of robust no-arbitrage condition as defined in [15]. For simplicity, let us consider the case
e = 1. By following arguments in Proposition 3.3 of [14], ℓ1ζ1− |ℓ1|c11d+
∑T
t=0 ηt ∈ KT P-q.s.
can be shown as equivalent to
ℓ1g1
(
ω¯, θ̂
)
+
( T∑
t=1
Ht∆Xt
)
(ω¯) ≥ 0, P-q.s. and for both θ̂ = ±1,
where Ht :=
∑t−1
s=0 ηs and g1(ω¯,±1) := ζ1 · XT ± c1. The robust no-arbitrage condition in
Definition 2.9 will lead to
ℓ1g1
(
ω¯, θ̂
)
+
( T∑
t=1
Ht∆Xt
)
(ω¯) = 0, P-q.s. and for both θ̂ = ±1.
As g1(ω¯, 1) 6= g1(ω,−1) when c1 > 0, one obtains ℓ1 = 0.
Remark 3.4. (i) The existence of optimal trading strategy (ℓˆ, ηˆ) in Theorem 3.1 is an auxiliary
result in the proof of duality (3.16) in our context with exponential utility function U(x) :=
− exp(−γx). Both duality and the existence of optimal strategy rely crucially on the minimax
argument (Lemma 4.10) which uses the affine feature of the exponential utility.
(ii) In the robust context and for general utility functions (with or without transaction cost),
different results on the existence of the optimal strategy have been obtained in the literature. Nutz
[31] seems to be the first to introduce this discrete time robust utility maximization problem and
obtains the existence result for general utility functions bounded from above and defined on the
positive real line. Blanchard and Carassus [12] were able to relax the boundedness condition to
some integrability condition. Neufeld and Sikic [30] study the robust utility maximization problem
with friction and obtain some existence result under a linear type of no-arbitrage condition.
Rasonyi and Meireles-Rodrigues [33] use a Komlo´s-type argument to prove the existence of the
optimal strategy. Bartl et al. [4] study similar problem by the medial limit argument.
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(iii) After the completion of our paper, Bayraktar and Burzoni [5] provided a generalization
of the randomization approach in [14] and proved a pricing-hedging duality under a weaker
no-arbitrage condition than the NA2(P) condition. Their generalized randomization approach
should also allow to study the above utility maximization problem under the weak no-arbitrage
condition.
3.2 Properties of utility indifference prices
It is well known that the superhedging price is too high in practice. As an alternative way, the
utility-based indifference price has been actively studied, in which the investor’s risk aversion
is inherently incorporated. This section presents an application of the convex duality relation-
ship (3.17) for the exponential utility maximization and provides some interesting features of
indifference prices in the presence of both proportional transaction costs and model uncertainty.
Generally speaking, the indifference pricing in our setting can be generated by semi-static trad-
ing strategies on risky assets and liquid options.
In the robust framework, similar to Theorem 2.4 of [3] in the frictionless model, the duality
representation (3.17) can help us to derive that the asymptotic indifference prices converge to
the superhedging price as the risk aversion γ → ∞ regardless of the transaction costs. To see
this, let us first recall the superhedging price defined by
π(ξ) := inf
{
y +
e∑
i=1
ci|ℓi| : y1d +
e∑
i=1
ℓiζi +
T∑
t=0
ηt − ξ ∈ KT ,P − q.s., (ℓ, η) ∈ Ae
}
= sup
(Q,Z)∈Se
EQ[ξ · ZT ],
where the equality follows from Theorem 3.1 of [14] with
Se :=
{
(Q, Z) ∈ S0 : E
Q
[
(ζi · ZT )
]
∈ [−ci, ci], i = 1, · · · , e
}
.
The indifference price πγ(ξ) ∈ R of derivative option ξ is, one the other hand, defined by
equation
V (01d, γ) = V
(
πγ(ξ)1d − ξ, γ
)
, (3.18)
where V (·) is defined by (3.13). Plugging the expression of V (·) into (3.18), and recall that
U(x) = −e−γx, we obtain
exp(−γπγ(ξ)) × sup
(ℓ,η)∈Ae
inf
P∈P
EP
[
− exp
(
− γ
(
− ξ +
e∑
i=1
(ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d) +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
= sup
(ℓ,η)∈Ae
inf
P∈P
EP
[
− exp
(
− γ
( e∑
i=1
(ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d) +
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d)]
. (3.19)
By the duality representation (3.16), we finally have that
πγ(ξ) = sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
− sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
. (3.20)
The formula (3.20) yields directly the next few properties of the utility indifference price.
Lemma 3.5. The following basic properties hold:
(i) πγ(ξ) does not depend on the initial wealth x0.
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(ii) πγ(ξ) is increasing in γ (monotonicity in γ).
(iii) πγ(βξ) = βπβγ(ξ) for any β ∈ (0, 1] (volume scaling).
(iv) πγ(ξ + c) = c+ πγ(ξ) for c ∈ R (translation invariance).
(v) πγ(αξ1 + (1− α)ξ2) ≤ απγ(ξ1) + (1 − α)πγ(ξ2) (convexity).
(vi) πγ(ξ1) ≤ πγ(ξ2) if ξ1 ≤ ξ2 (monotonicity).
The next result shows the risk-averse asymptotics on the utility indifference prices. Similar
results can also be found in [21, 13, 3].
Proposition 3.6. In the robust setting of Theorem 3.1 with proportional transaction costs, we
have
π(ξ) = lim
γ→∞
πγ(ξ). (3.21)
We postpone the proof of the above result to Section 4.4, as it demands some notations and
results given afterwards.
Remark 3.7. Observing the scaling property in item (iii) of Lemma 3.5, the limit (3.21) can
be rewritten as limβ→∞
1
βπγ(βξ) = π(ξ), in which the term
1
βπγ(βξ) can be understood as the
price per unit for a given amount volume β of the contingent claim ξ.
Furthermore, with increasing risk aversion, the convex duality result (3.17) also yields that
the optimal hedging strategies under the exponential utility preference converge to the super-
hedging counterpart in the following sense.
Proposition 3.8. We have that
lim
γ→∞
sup
P∈P
EP
(π(ξ)1d + e∑
i=1
(
ℓ⋆,γi ζi − |ℓ
⋆,γ
i |ci1d
)
+
T∑
t=0
η⋆,γt − ξ
)− = 0,
where (ℓ⋆,γ , η⋆,γ) is an optimal semi-static strategy to the problem (3.17) under the risk aversion
level γ.
Proof. Let us set Γγ := π(ξ)1d +
∑e
i=1
(
ℓ⋆,γi ζi − |ℓ
⋆,γ
i |ci1d
)
+
∑T
t=0 η
⋆,γ
t − ξ and it follows by
(3.17) that
sup
P∈P
logEP[e−γΓγ ] = sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
γEQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− γπ(ξ)− E(Q,P)
}
. (3.22)
If π(ξ) = +∞, it is clear that supP∈P logE
P[e−γΓγ ] = −∞. Otherwise, if π(ξ) < +∞, it follows
by item (ii) of Lemma 3.5 that πγ(ξ) is increasing in γ and moreover πγ(ξ) ≤ π(ξ). Therefore,
it yields that supP∈P logE
P[e−γΓγ ] ≤ 0 and hence EP[e−γΓγ ] ≤ 1 uniformly for all P ∈ P . By
Jensen’s inequality, we have
sup
P∈P
EP[Γ−γ ] ≤
1
γ
sup
P∈P
logEP[eγΓ
−
γ ] ≤
1
γ
sup
P∈P
log(1 + EP[e−γΓγ ]),
which completes the proof.
Remark 3.9. Similar results have been obtained in Corollary 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 of [23] in the
classical dominated frictionless market model. Thanks to the convex duality (3.17), this paper
makes nontrivial extension of the asymptotic convergence on risk aversion level to the setting
with both proportional transaction costs and model uncertainty.
Again, based on the convex duality representation obtained in the enlarged space, the con-
tinuity property and Fatou property of the indifference prices can be shown in the following
sense.
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Proposition 3.10. (i) If (ξn)n∈N is a sequence of option payoffs such that
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
EQ[(ξn − ξ) · ZT ]→ 0 and inf
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
EQ[(ξn − ξ) · ZT ]→ 0. (3.23)
then πγ(ξn)→ πγ(ξ) for any γ > 0.
(ii) For ξn ≥ 0, we have
πγ(lim inf
n
ξn) ≤ lim inf
n
πγ(ξn). (3.24)
(iii) If (ξn)n∈N is a sequence of option payoffs such that ξnրξ, P-a.s., then πγ(ξn)րπγ(ξ).
Proof. (i) Recall that πγ(ξ) = sup(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− 1γ E(Q,P)
}
−sup(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
− 1γ E(Q,P)
}
in (3.20), we can obtain that
|πγ(ξn)− πγ(ξ)| =
∣∣∣ sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξn · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
− sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
} ∣∣∣
≤ sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
|EQ[(ξn − ξ) · ZT ]|.
The continuity πγ(ξn)→ πγ(ξ) follows directly by (3.23).
(ii) The Fatou property can be derived by observing that
πγ(lim inf
n
ξn) = sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
lim inf
n
ξn · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
− sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
≤ sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
lim inf
n
EQ
[
ξn · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
− sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
≤ lim inf
n
(
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξn · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
− sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
})
= lim inf
n
πγ(ξn).
(iii) By the Fatou property from part (ii) and item (vi) of Lemma 3.5, we have
πγ(ξ) ≥ lim inf
n
πγ(ξn) ≥ πγ(ξ),
which completes the proof.
4 Proof of main results
This section provides the technical arguments to establish the convex duality (3.17) and we shall
first work in the fictitious frictionless market on the enlarged space. All three results, namely the
convex duality theorem, the dynamic programming principle and the existence of the optimal
portfolio will be confirmed. Translating the transaction costs into additional randomness on
the enlarged space in both primal and dual problems plays a crucial role to develop some key
equivalences.
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4.1 Reformulation of the dual problem
As a first step to reduce the complexity of the proof, the standard dual problem based on CPS
in the model with transaction costs will be reformulated on the enlarged dual space. Define
Q
∗
:=
{
Q ∈ Q0 : E
Q
[
(ξ ·XT )−
]
+ E(Q,P int) <∞
}
,
where E(Q,P int) is defined exactly as E(Q,P) in (3.14). For any universally measurable random
variable ϕ : Ω→ R+, we further define
Q
∗
ϕ :=
{
Q ∈ Q
∗
: EQ
[
ϕ
]
<∞
}
and Q
∗
ϕ(0, θ0) :=
{
Q ∈ Q
∗
ϕ : Q[Θ0 = θ0] = 1
}
.
The function ϕ will be chosen depending on the context, it allows to control the integrability of
some extra random variables when one considers the subsets of Q
∗
and also in some iteration
arguments.
Lemma 4.1. For any universally measurable random vector ξ : Ω→ Rd, one has
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗
0
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− E(Q,P)
}
= sup
Q∈Q
∗
{
EQ
[
ξ ·XT ]− E(Q,P int)
}
.
Proof. First, for a given (Q, Z) ∈ S∗0 , we associate the probability kernel:
qZ : ω ∈ Ω 7→ qZ(·|ω) := δ(Z/S)(ω) ∈ B(Λ),
and define Q := Q⊗qZ . The construction implies that EQ
[
ξ ·ZT
]
= EQ
[
ξ ·XT ] and that Q ∈ Q
∗
.
Moreover, for every P ∈ P , one can similarly define P := P ⊗ qZ ∈ P int. If Q ≪ P, one has
Q≪ P and dQ/dP = dQ/dP, P-a.s. If Q≪ P is not true, then E(Q,P) =∞ by definition. This
implies that E(Q,P) ≥ E(Q,P int). Therefore,
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗
0
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− E(Q,P)
}
≤ sup
Q∈Q
∗
{
EQ
[
ξ ·XT ]− E(Q,P int)
}
.
Conversely, let us fix Q ∈ Q
∗
, and define Q := Q|Ω and Zt := EQ
[
Xt
∣∣Ft] for t ≤ T . As Q≪ P
for some P ∈ P int, then Q ≪ P := P|Ω ∈ P . Moreover, the fact that X is an (F,Q)-martingale
implies that Z is an (F,Q)-martingale. Then, (Q, Z) ∈ S∗0 and E
Q
[
ξ · ZT
]
= EQ
[
ξ ·XT ]. Now
as dQ/dP = EP[dQ/dP|FT ] and x 7→ x log(x) is convex on R+, we have E(Q,P) ≤ E(Q,P) by
Jensen’s inequality. It follows that
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗
0
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− E(Q,P)
}
≥ sup
Q∈Q
∗
{
EQ
[
ξ ·XT ]− E(Q,P int)
}
,
and we hence conclude the proof.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 3.1(Case e = 0)
In view of Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 2.6, one can first establish the duality result of the utility
maximization problem on the enlarged space Ω, in order to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 4.2. Let g := ξ ·XT and NA(P int) hold true. Then for any universally measurable
random variable ϕ : Ω→ R+, one has
V := inf
H∈H
sup
P∈Pint
logEP
[
exp
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
= sup
Q∈Q
∗
{
EQ
[
g
]
− E(Q,P int)
}
(4.25)
= sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ
{
EQ
[
g
]
− E(Q,P int)
}
.
Moreover, the infimum of the problem V is attained by some optimal trading strategy Ĥ ∈ H.
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Remark 4.3. The above duality result is similar to that in [3], but differs substantially with
theirs in the following two points:
(i) In our current work, we have relaxed the strong one-period no-arbitrage condition for all
ωt ∈ Ωt assumed in [3]. Indeed, the strong no-arbitrage condition is needed in [3] because their
duality and dynamic programming are mixed with each other. More precisely, with the notations
in [3, Section 4], they need the relation “Et(ω, x) = Dt(ω) + x” to hold for all t and ω ∈ Ωt
to guarantee the measurability of Et through Dt (see in particular their equation (21) and their
Proof of Lemma 4.6). In Appendix A.3, we shall give more details on this point.
(ii) It is worth noting that the reformulations in Proposition 2.6 on the enlarged space do not
exactly correspond to standard quasi-sure utility maximization problem. Indeed, we still restrict
the class of strategies to F˜-predictable processes, as opposed to F-predictable processes. The fact
that the formulation with these two different filtrations are equivalent will be proved by using a
minimax argument.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (case e = 0) First, using Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 2.6, the duality
(3.17) can be deduced immediately from (4.25) in Proposition 4.2. Moreover, given the optimal
trading strategy Ĥ ∈ H in Proposition 4.2, we can construct ηˆ by (2.8) and show its optimality
by almost the same arguments as in Step 2 of Proposition 2.6 (ii).
In the rest of Section 4.2, we will provide the proof of Proposition 4.2 in several steps.
The weak duality As in the classical results, one can easily obtain a weak duality result.
Lemma 4.4. For any universally measurable function g : Ω→ R ∪ {∞}, one has
inf
H∈H
sup
P∈Pint
logEP
[
exp
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
≥ sup
Q∈Q
∗
{
EQ[g]− E(Q,P int)
}
.
Proof. Using the result in the [3, Proof of Theorem 4.1 - dynamic programming principle], one
knows that for any H ∈ H, P ∈ P int and Q ∈ Q
∗
, one has
logEP
[
exp
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
≥ EQ[g]− E(Q,P).
(Note that E(Q,P) =∞ if Q is not dominated by P.) Therefore it is enough to take supremum
over Q (and P) and then take infimum over H ∈ H to obtain the two weak duality results in
the claim.
We can next turn to (and for the duality, it suffices to) prove that
inf
H∈H
sup
P∈Pint
logEP
[
exp
(
g + (H ◦X)T
)]
≤ sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ
{
EQ
[
g]− E(Q,P int)
}
, (4.26)
for any universally measurable random variable ϕ : Ω→ [0,∞).
The one-period case T = 1 Let us first consider the one-period case T = 1. Define
Λint(0, ω0) := {θ0 ∈ Λ1 : S0(ω0)θ0 ∈ intK
∗
0},
and for each θ0 ∈ Λint(0, ω0),
P
δ
int(0, θ0) :=
{
P ∈ P int : P[Θ0 = θ0] = 1
}
.
Define NA(P
δ
int(0, θ0)) as NA(P int) in Definition 2.9 with P
δ
int(0, θ0) in place of P int. Then,
NA(P int) implies that NA(P
δ
int(0, θ0)) holds for every θ0 ∈ Λint(0, ω0).
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Lemma 4.5. Let T = 1, and g1 : Ω→ R∪{∞} be upper semi-analytic and also (ω, θ0, θ1) ∈ Ω×
Λ1×Λ1 → g1(ω, θ0, θ1) depend only on (ω, θ1). Assume that NA(P int) holds. Then, for g = g1,
the inequality (4.26) holds for any universally measurable random variable ϕ : Ω → [0,∞) and
both terms are not equal to −∞. Moreover, there exists an optimal solution Ĥ ∈ H for the
infimum problem at the left hand side. In consequence, Proposition 4.2 holds true for the case
T = 1.
Proof. Step 1 : Although the context is slightly different, we can still follow the same arguments
line by line in step (b) of the proof of Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 of [3] to obtain the existence
of the optimal strategy Ĥ (see also the proof of Theorem 2.2 of [31]), where the key argument
is to show that h 7→ supP∈Pint logE
P
[
exp(g + h(X1 −X0))
]
is lower-semicontinuous.
Step 2 : We then turn to prove the duality. First, notice that H = Rd when T = 1, and that
(g1, X1)(ω, θ0, θ1) is independent of θ0. Then, for all θ0 ∈ Λint(0, ω0),{
P ◦ (g1, X1)
−1 : P ∈ P int(0, θ0)
}
=
{
P ◦ (g1, X1)
−1 : P ∈ P int(0,1)
}
,
where 1 represents the vector of Rd with all entries equal to 1. Thanks to the standard con-
catenation argument, it is clear that
V = inf
h1∈Rd
sup
θ0∈Λint(0,ω0)
sup
P≪P
δ
int(0,θ0)
logEP
[
exp(g1 + h1 ·X1 − h1 · S0θ0)
]
.
Define the function
α(h1, θ0) := sup
P≪P
δ
int(0,θ0)
logEP
[
exp(g1 + h1 ·X1 − h1 · S0θ0)
]
.
We first observe that
θ0 7→ α(h1, θ0) = sup
P≪P
δ
int(0,1)
logEP[exp(g1 + h1 ·X1 − h1 · S0θ0)] is affine.
We claim further that h1 7→ α(h1, θ0) is convex. Indeed, for any (universally measurable)
random variables Y1 and Y2, it follows by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality that
EP
[
exp
(
(Y1 + Y2)/2
)]
≤
(
EP
[
exp(Y1)
]) 12(
EP
[
exp(Y2)
]) 12
.
By taking logarithm on both sides, one has
logEP
[
exp
(
(Y1 + Y2)/2
)]
≤
1
2
(
logEP
[
exp(Y1)
]
+ logEP
[
exp(Y2)
])
,
from which one observes that
h1 7→ logE
P
[
exp(g1 + h1 ·X1 − h1 · S0θ0)
]
is convex.
As the pointwise supremum of an arbitrary family of convex functions is still convex, it follows
that h1 7→ α(h1, θ0) is convex.
This allows us to use minimax theorem to deduce that
V = inf
h1∈Rd
sup
θ0∈Λint(0,ω0)
α(h1, θ0) = inf
h1∈Rd
sup
θ0∈Λ(0,ω0)
α(h1, θ0) = sup
θ0∈Λ(0,ω0)
inf
h1∈Rd
α(h1, θ0)
= sup
θ0∈Λint(0,ω0)
inf
h1∈Rd
sup
P≪P
δ
int(0,θ0)
logEP
[
exp(g1 + h1 ·X1 − h1 · S0θ0)
]
.
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In the above argument, Λ(0, ω0) denotes the closure of Λint(0, ω0), and we can replace Λint(0, ω0)
by Λ(0, ω0) since θ0 7→ α(h1, θ0) is affine, and θ0 7→ infh1∈Rd α(h1, θ0) is concave and hence lower
semicontinuous. Using the one period duality result in [3, Theorem 3.1], we obtain
V = sup
θ0∈Λint(0,ω0)
sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ(0,θ0)
{
EQ[g1]− E
(
Q,P
δ
int(0, θ0)
)}
.
Step 3 : To conclude the proof, it is enough to prove that
sup
θ0∈Λint(0,ω0)
sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ(0,θ0)
{
EQ[g1]− E
(
Q,P
δ
int(0, θ0)
)}
≥ sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ
{
EQ
[
g1]− E(Q,P int)
}
, (4.27)
as the reverse inequality is trivial by the fact that Q
∗
ϕ(0, θ0) ⊂ Q
∗
ϕ and that E
(
Q,P
δ
int(0, θ0)
)
=
E(Q,P int) for all Q ∈ Q
∗
ϕ(0, θ0). Let Q ∈ Q
∗
ϕ and denote by (Qθ0)θ0∈Λint(0,ω0) a family of r.c.p.d.
of Q knowing θ0, then by [3, Lemma 4.4], we have
EQ
[
g1]− E(Q,P int) = E
Q
[
EQθ0
[
g1
]
− E
(
Qθ0 ,P
δ
int(0, θ0)
)]
− E
(
Q ◦ θ−10 ,P int|Ω0
)
≤ sup
θ0∈Λint(0,ω0)
sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ(0,θ0)
{
EQ[g1]− E
(
Q,P
δ
int(0, θ0)
)}
.
Taking the supremum over Q in Q
∗
ϕ, we verify (4.27).
The multi-period case: measurable selection of the dynamic strategy Let us
extend the above definitions of Λint(0, ω0), P
δ
int(0, θ0) and Q
∗
ϕ(0, θ0) to an arbitrary initial time
t and initial path ω¯t. For t ≥ 1 and ω¯ = ω¯t = (ωt, θt) ∈ Ωt, let us first recall the definition of
Λint(t, ω
t) :
Λint(t, ω
t) := {θt ∈ Λ1 : St(ω
t)θt ∈ intK
∗
t (ω
t)} ⊂ Λ1.
Note that P int(t, ω¯) ⊂ B(Ω1 × Λ1) is defined in (2.7). We introduce
P
δ
int(t, ω¯) :=
{
δω¯t ⊗ Pt+1 : Pt+1 ∈ P int(t, ω¯)
}
, (4.28)
and
P˜δint(t, ω) :=
{
(δωt × µ(dθ
t))⊗ Pt+1 : Pt+1 ∈ P int(t, ω¯), µ ∈ B
(
Λint(0, ω0)× · · · × Λint(t, ω
t)
)}
,
where the latter consists in a version of P
δ
int(t, ω¯) in which θ
t is not fixed anymore.
Remark 4.6. (i) For a fixed ω ∈ Ωt, let us define NA(P˜
δ
int(t, ω)) by
h(Xt) · (Xt+1 −Xt) ≥ 0, P˜
δ
int(t, ω)-q.s. =⇒ h(Xt) · (Xt+1 −Xt) = 0, P˜
δ
int(t, ω)-q.s.,
for every universally measurable function h : Rd → Rd. By applying Proposition 2.11 with
P(t, ω) in place of P, one obtains that NA2(t, ω) defined in (4.29) is equivalent to NA(P˜δint(t, ω)).
(ii) We recall that for each t ≤ T and ω ∈ Ωt, the condition NA2(t, ω) is satisfied if
ζ ∈ Kt+1(ω, ·), Pt(ω)-q.s. implies ζ ∈ Kt(ω), for all ζ ∈ R
d. (4.29)
Then by [16, Lemma 3.6], the set Nt := {ω : NA2(t, ω) fails} is universally measurable. More-
over, Nt is a P-polar set if NA2(P) holds.
(iii) It follows from (i) and (ii) that NA2(t, ω) or equivalently P˜δint(t, ω) holds for all ω outside
a P-polar set N , whenever NA2(P) holds. The latter is equivalent to NA(P int) by Proposition
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2.11. Therefore, if NA(P int) holds, there exists a P int-polar N := N × Λ, such that for all
ω¯ = (ω, θ) /∈ N , NA(P˜δint(t, ω)) holds.
(iv) Finally, for a fixed ω¯ ∈ Ωt, we define NA(P
δ
int(t, ω¯)) by
h · (Xt+1 −Xt) ≥ 0, P
δ
int(t, ω¯)-q.s. =⇒ h · (Xt+1 −Xt) = 0, P
δ
int(t, ω¯)-q.s.,
for every h ∈ Rd. Then, NA(P˜δint(t, ω)) implies NA(P
δ
int(t, ω, θ)) for all θ ∈ Λ (see also Remark
3.9 of [14]).
Let us fix a functional gt+1 : Ωt+1 → R ∪ {∞} which is upper semi-analytic and such
that gt+1(ω
t+1, θ0, · · · , θt+1) depends only on (ω
t+1, θt+1). Then for any universally measurable
random variable Yt+1 : Ωt+1 → R+, we introduce
Q
∗
Yt+1(t, ω¯) :=
Q ∈ B(Ωt+1) : Q≪ P
δ
int(t, ω¯), E
Q[Xt+1 −Xt] = 0, E
Q[Yt+1] <∞,
EQ
[
g−t+1 + |Xt+1 −Xt|
]
+ E
(
Q,P
δ
int(t, ω¯)
)
<∞
 ,
and by setting Yt+1 ≡ 0, we define
gt(ω¯
t) := sup
Q∈Q
∗
0(t,ω¯
t)
{
EQ[gt+1]− E
(
Q,P
δ
int(t, ω¯
t)
)}
, for all ω¯t ∈ Ωt. (4.30)
Remark 4.7. Let ω¯ = (ω, θ) and ω¯′ = (ω′, θ′) be such that ωt = (ω′)t and θt = θ
′
t. Then, it
follows from the definition of P
δ
int(t, ω¯) and Q
∗
Yt+1(t, ω¯) that{
Q ◦ (gt+1, Xt, Xt+1)
−1 : Q ∈ Q
∗
Yt+1(t, ω¯)
}
=
{
Q ◦ (gt+1, Xt, Xt+1)
−1 : Q ∈ Q
∗
Yt+1(t, ω¯
′)
}
.
Since gt+1(ω
t+1, θ0, · · · , θt+1) is assumed to be independent of (θ0, · · · , θt), then it is clear that
gt(ω¯
t) depends only on (ωt, θt) for ω¯
t = (ωt, θ0, · · · , θt).
The above remark allows us to define
g′t(ω
t, h) := sup
θt∈Λint(t,ωt)
{
gt(ω
t, θt) + h · St(ω)θt
}
, ∀ (ωt, h) ∈ Ωt × R
d. (4.31)
Remark 4.8. From Remark 4.6, NA(P int) implies that NA(P
δ
int(t, ω¯)) holds for P-a.e. ω¯ ∈ Ω
under any P ∈ P int. We can in fact apply Theorem 3.1 of [3] to obtain that
gt(ω¯) = sup
Q∈Q
∗
Yt+1
(t,ω¯)
{
EQ[gt+1]− E
(
Q,P
δ
int(t, ω¯)
)}
, P int-q.s.,
for all universally measurable random variables Yt+1 : Ωt+1 → R+.
Lemma 4.9. For every t, the graph set[[
Q
∗
0(t)
]]
:=
{
(ω¯,Q) : ω¯ ∈ Ωt,Q ∈ Q
∗
0(t, ω¯)
}
is analytic.
Proof. We follow the arguments in Lemma 4.5 of [3] and Lemma 4.8 of [15]. First, as gt+1 ∧
0 + |Xt+1 − Xt| is upper semi-analytic, an application of Proposition 7.48 of [11] shows that
(ω¯,Q) 7→ EQ
[
gt+1 ∧ 0− |Xt+1 −Xt|
]
is upper semi-analytic.
Furthermore, from the definition of P
δ
int(t) in (4.28), one observes that the graph set
[[
P
δ
int(t)
]]
is analytic, as
[[
P int(t)
]]
is analytic (see Remark 2.5). Then using the Borel measurability of
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the relative entropy (Lemma 4.2 of [3]), one obtains from a measurable selection argument (see
e.g. Proposition 7.47 of [11]) that (ω¯,Q) 7→ −E
(
Q,P
δ
int(t, ω¯)
)
is upper semi-analytic.
It follows that
A :=
{
(ω¯,Q) : EQ [gt+1 ∧ 0− |Xt+1 −Xt|]− E
(
Q,P
δ
int(t, ω¯)
)
> −∞
}
is an analytic set. By Lemma 4.8 of [15], we know
B(ω¯) := {(Q,P) ∈ B(Ωt+1)×B(Ωt+1) : P ∈ P
δ
int(t, ω¯), E
Q[Xt+1 −Xt] = 0, Q≪ P}
has an analytic graph. Notice that the set
C :=
{(
ω¯,Q
)
: Q≪ P
δ
int(t, ω¯), E
Q[Xt+1 −Xt] = 0
}
is the image of the graph set
[[
B
]]
under canonical projection Ωt × B(Ωt+1) × B(Ωt+1) 7→
Ωt ×B(Ωt+1) and thus analytic. Finally, it is shown that[[
Q
∗
0(t)
]]
= A ∩ C
is analytic.
Lemma 4.10. Assume that NA(P int) holds true. Then both gt and g′t are upper semi-analytic,
and there is a universally measurable map ht+1 : Ωt × Rd → Rd together with a P-polar set N
such that, for every (ω, ht) ∈ N
c × Rd, one has
g′t(ω
t, ht) = sup
θt∈Λint(t,ωt)
sup
P∈P
δ
int(t,ω¯)
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + ht+1(ω
t, ht)(Xt+1 −Xt) + htXt
)]
> −∞.
Proof. The proof follows the track of measurable selection arguments as in Lemma 3.7 of [31]
with some modifications for our setting. Let us denote, for all ωt ∈ Ωt and ht ∈ Rd,
V ′t (ω
t, ht) := inf
h∈Rd
sup
θt∈Λint(t,ωt)
sup
P∈P
δ
int(t,ω¯)
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + h(Xt+1 −Xt) + htXt
)]
.
By Remark 4.7, we can employ the same minimax theorem argument as in Lemma 4.5 above
and obtain that
V ′t (ω
t, ht) = g
′
t(ω
t, ht) > −∞, if NA(P˜
δ
int(t, ω)) holds true.
In view of (iii) in Remark 4.6, this holds true outside a P-polar set N .
Further, let us denote by U(Ωt × Rd) the universal σ-field on Ωt × Rd. Notice that gt+1 is
assumed to be upper semi-analytic, the graph set
[[
Q
∗
0(t)
]]
is analytic by Lemma 4.9, (ω¯t,Q) ∈
Ωt×B(Ωt+1) 7→ E
(
Q,P
δ
int(t, ω¯
t)
)
is lower semi-analytic by [3, Lemma 4.2] and [11, Proposition
7.47]. It follows from the measurable selection argument (see e.g. [11, Propositions 7.26, 7.47,
7.48]) that the maps ω¯t 7→ gt(ω¯t) is upper semi-analytic. As
[[
intK∗t
]]
is Borel and hence[[
Λint(t, ·)
]]
is also Borel, it follows from [11, Proposition 7.47] that (ωt, ht) 7→ g′t(ω
t, ht) is
upper semi-analytic, hence belongs to U(Ωt × Rd).
Next, we claim that the function
φ(ωt, ht, h) : = sup
θt∈Λint(t,ωt)
sup
P∈P
δ
int(t,ω¯)
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + h(Xt+1 −Xt) + htXt
)]
.
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is U(Ωt × Rd) ⊗ B(Rd)-measurable. To see this, we first fix h and ht. Then from the same
argument as above, as
[[
P
δ
int(t)
]]
is analytic and by [11, Propositions 7.26, 7.47, 7.48], we have
that
(ωt, θt) 7→ sup
P∈P
δ
int(t,ω¯)
logEP[exp
(
gt+1 + h(Xt+1 −Xt) + htXt)]
is upper semi-analytic. Again,
[[
intK∗t
]]
is Borel implies that
[[
Λint(t, ·)
]]
is also Borel, by
[11, Proposition 7.47], we have that ωt 7→ φ(ωt, ht, h) is upper semi-analytic. On the other
hand, for fixed ωt, it follows by an application of Fatou’s lemma (as [3, Lemma 4.6]) that
(h, ht) 7→ φ(ωt, ht, h) is lower semi-continuous. Moreover, as (h, ht) 7→ φ(ωt, ht, h) is convex, by
[12, Lemma 4.5], we have that φ is indeed Ft⊗B(Rd)⊗B(Rd)-measurable, and thus belongs to
U(Ωt × Rd)⊗ B(Rd).
Let us consider the random set
Φ(ωt, ht) :=
{
h ∈ Rd : φ(ωt, ht, h) = g
′
t(ω
t, ht)
}
.
By the previous arguments, we have that [[Φ]] is in U(Ωt × Rd) ⊗ B(Rd). Thus Φ admits an
U(Ωt × Rd)-measurable selector ht+1 on the universally measurable set Φ(ωt, ht) 6= ∅; cf. the
corollary and scholium of [28, Theorem 5.5]. Moreover, Lemma 4.5 and Remark 4.6 imply
that Φ(ωt, ht) 6= ∅ holds true outside a P-polar set N , it yields that ht+1 solves the infimum
P-q.s.
The multi-period case: the final proof We provide a last technical lemma and then
finish the proof of Proposition 4.2. Recall that gt+1 := Ωt+1 → R ∪ {∞} is a given upper
semi-analytic functional, such that gt+1(ω
t+1, θ0, · · · , θt+1) depends only on (ωt+1, θt+1), and gt
is defined in (4.30). Given a universally measurable random variable Yt : Ωt → R+, we define
Q
∗
Yt,t := {Q ∈ Q0|Ωt : E
Q
[
g−t
]
+ E
(
Q,P int|Ωt
)
< +∞, EQ[Yt] < +∞}.
Lemma 4.11. Let t + 1 ≤ T , then for any universally measurable random variable Yt+1 :
Ωt+1 → R+ and ε > 0, there is a universally measurable random variable Y εt : Ωt → R+ such
that
sup
Q∈Q
∗
Y εt ,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P int|Ωt
)}
≤ sup
Q∈Q
∗
Yt+1,t+1
{
EQ[gt+1]− E
(
Q,P int|Ωt+1
)}
+ ε. (4.32)
Proof. (i) In view of Corollary A.7, we can assume w.l.o.g. that Yt+1 ≡ 0. Then Lemma 4.9
and a measurable selection argument (see e.g. Proposition 7.50 of [11]) guarantees that there
exists a universally measurable kernel Q
ε
t (·) : Ωt → B(Ω1) such that δω¯ ⊗ Q
ε
t (ω¯) ∈ Q
∗
0(t, ω¯) for
all ω¯ ∈ Ωt, and
gt(ω¯) ≤ E
δω¯⊗Q
ε
t (ω¯)[gt+1]− E
(
Q
ε
t (ω¯),P int(t, ω¯)
)
+ ε.
(ii) Let us define Y εt by
Y εt (·) := E
δ·⊗Q
ε
t (·)
[
g−t+1 + |Xt+1 −Xt|
]
+ E
(
Q
ε
t (·),P int(t, ·)
)
.
By the definition of Q
∗
0(t, ·) and [3, Lemma 4.2], Y
ε
t is R+-valued and universally measurable.
Then for any Q ∈ Q
∗
Y εt ,t
, one has
EQ⊗Q
ε
t (·)
[
g−t+1 + |Xt+1 −Xt|
]
+ E(Q ⊗Q
ε
t (·),P int|Ωt+1)
= EQ
[
EQ
ε
t (·)[g−t+1 + |Xt+1 −Xt|]
]
+ E(Q,P int|Ωt) + E
Q
[
E(Q
ε
t (·),P int(t, ·))
]
≤ E(Q,P int|Ωt) + E
Q[Y εt ] < +∞,
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where the first equality follows from Lemma 4.4 of [3]. Further, Q ⊗ Q
ε
t (·) is a martingale
measure on Ωt+1 by the martingale property of Q and Q
ε
t (·). Finally, because Q≪ P int|Ωt and
Q
ε
t (·)≪ P int(t, ·), it follows that Q⊗Q
ε
t (·)≪ P int|Ωt+1 . This implies that Q⊗Q
ε
t (·) ∈ Q
∗
0,t+1.
Thus for any Q ∈ Q
∗
Y εt ,t
, one has
EQ[gt]− E(Q,P int|Ωt) ≤ E
Q
[
EQ
ε
t (·)[gt+1]− E
(
Q
ε
t (·),P int(t, ·)
)
+ ε
]
− E(Q,P int|Ωt)
= EQ⊗Q
ε
t (·)[gt+1]− E(Q⊗Q
ε
t (·),P int|Ωt+1) + ε
≤ sup
Q∈Q
∗
0,t+1
{
EQ[gt+1]− E(Q,P int|Ωt+1)
}
+ ε.
We hence conclude the proof as Q ∈ Q
∗
Y εt ,t
is arbitrary.
Proof of Proposition 4.2. We will use an induction argument. First, Proposition 4.2 in case
T = 1 is already proved in Lemma 4.5. Next, assume that Proposition 4.2 holds true for the
case T = t, we then consider the case T = t+ 1.
In the case T = t + 1, let us denote gt+1 := g := ξ · Xt+1. It is clear that gt+1 is a Borel
random variable and gt+1(ω
t+1, θ0, · · · , θt+1) depends only on (ωt+1, θt+1). Let gt be defined
by (4.30). Since Proposition 4.2 is assumed to hold true for the case T = t, it follows that
there is Hˆ = (Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆt) ∈ Ht such that, for any universally measurable random variable
Yt : Ωt → R+, one has
sup
P∈Pint
logEP
[
exp(gt + (Hˆ ◦X)t
)]
= sup
Q∈Q
∗
Yt,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P int|Ωt
)}
. (4.33)
Then with the function ht+1 defined in Lemma 4.10, we define
Hˆt+1(ω
t) := ht+1(ω
t, Hˆt(ω
t−1)). (4.34)
Further, for any P ∈ P int, one has the representation P = P0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pt, where Ps(·) is
measurable kernel in P
δ
int(s, ·). It follows by direct computation that
EP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦X)t+1
)]
= EP0⊗···⊗Pt−1
[
exp
(
logEPt
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦X)t+1
)])]
≤ EP
[
exp
(
sup
P
′
∈P
δ
int(t,·)
logEP
′
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦X)t+1
)])]
≤ sup
P∈Pint
EP
[
exp
(
g′t(·, Hˆt) + (Hˆ ◦X)t−1 − HˆtXt−1
)]
,
where the last inequality follows by the definition of Hˆt+1 in (4.34) and Lemma 4.10. Taking the
supremum over P ∈ P int, it follows from the definition of g′t in (4.31) together with a dynamic
programming argument that
sup
P∈Pint
EP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦X)t+1
)]
≤ sup
P∈Pint
EP
[
exp
(
gt + HˆtXt + (Hˆ ◦X)t−1 − HˆtXt−1
)]
= sup
P∈Pint
EP
[
exp
(
gt + (Hˆ ◦X)t
)]
. (4.35)
Then for any universally measurable random variable ϕ : Ω → R+, we set Yt+1 := ϕ and use
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sequentially Lemma 4.11, (4.33), (4.35), to obtain
sup
Q∈Q
∗
ϕ
{
EQ[gt+1]− E(Q,P int|Ωt+1)
}
≥ sup
Q∈Q
∗
Yt,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P int|Ωt
)}
= sup
P∈Pint
logEP
[
exp(gt + (Hˆ ◦X)t
)]
≥ sup
P∈Pint
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦X)t+1
)]
≥ inf
H∈H
sup
P∈Pint
logEP [exp (gt+1 + (H ◦X)t+1)] .
Because the reverse inequality is the weak duality in Lemma 4.4, we obtain the equality ev-
erywhere in the above formula, which is the duality result (4.25) for the case T = t + 1. In
particular, (Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆt, Hˆt+1) is the optimal trading strategy for the case T = t+ 1.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1(Case e ≥ 1)
In this section, we are interested in the utility maximization problem with semi-static strategy.
To take into account of the transaction costs caused by trading the static options (ζi, i =
1, · · · , e), we work in the framework of [14] and introduce a further enlarged space by
Λ̂ :=
e∏
i=1
[−ci, ci], Ω̂ := Ω× Λ̂, F̂t := F t ⊗ B
(
Λ̂
)
, P̂int :=
{
P̂ ∈ B(Ω̂) : P̂|Ω ∈ P int
}
,
and define
fˆi : Ω̂ −→ R, fˆi(ωˆ) = ζi(ω) ·XT (ω¯)− θˆi for all ωˆ = (ω¯, θˆ) = (ω, θ, θˆ) ∈ Ω̂.
The process (Xt)0≤t≤T and the random variable g := ξ · XT defined on Ω can be naturally
extended on Ω̂.
We can then consider the exponential utility maximization problem on Ω̂:
inf
(H,ℓ)∈H×Re
sup
P̂∈P̂int
logEP̂
[
exp
(
g +
e∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + (H ◦X)T
)]
.
Let us also introduce
Q̂∗e :=
{
Q̂ ∈ B(Ω̂) :
Q̂≪ P̂int, X is (F̂, Q̂)-martingale, E
Q̂[fˆi] = 0, i = 1, · · · , e,
EQ̂
[
(ξ ·XT )−
]
+ E(Q̂, P̂int) < +∞
}
,
and
Q̂∗e,ϕ := {Q̂ ∈ Q̂
∗
e : E
Q̂[ϕ] < +∞}, for all ϕ : Ω̂→ R+.
It is easy to employ similar arguments for Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 2.6 to obtain
inf
(ℓ,η)∈Ae
sup
P∈P
logEP
exp
(ξ − e∑
i=1
(ℓiζi − |ℓi|ci1d)−
T∑
t=0
ηt
)d
= inf
(H,ℓ)∈H×Re
sup
P̂∈P̂int
logEP̂
[
exp
(
g +
e∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + (H ◦X)T
)]
,
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and
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
− E(Q,P)
}
= sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e
{
EQ̂
[
g
]
− E(Q̂, P̂int)
}
,
with g := ξ · XT . Hence, to conclude the proof of Theorem 3.1(case e ≥ 1), it is sufficient to
prove that, for any universally measurable ϕ : Ω̂→ R+, one has
inf
(H,ℓ)∈H×Re
sup
P̂∈P̂int
logEP̂
[
exp
(
g +
e∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + (H ◦X)T
)]
= sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
{
EQ̂
[
g
]
− E(Q̂, P̂int)
}
.(4.36)
Let us first provide a useful lemma.
Lemma 4.12. Let g : Ω→ R be upper semi-analytic, and assume that NA2(P) holds. Assume
either that e = 0, or that e ≥ 1 and for all ℓ ∈ Re and η ∈ A, (3.15) holds. Then, for all
ϕ : Ω̂→ R+, one has
inf
{
y ∈ R : y +
e∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + (H ◦X)T ≥ g, P̂int-q.s., l ∈ R
e, H ∈ H
}
= sup
Q∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
EQ
[
g
]
. (4.37)
Proof. By Proposition 2.11, NA2(P) implies NA(P int). For the case e = 0, as observed by [3,
Lemma 3.5], Lemma 3.3 of [15] has indeed proved the following stronger version of fundamental
lemma with T = 1:
0 ∈ ri{ EQ[∆X ], Q ∈ Q
∗
ϕ}. (4.38)
Using (4.38), we can proceed as [15, Lemma 3.5, 3.6, Theorem 4.1] to prove (4.37) in the case
without options(e = 0).
For the case e ≥ 1, we can argue by induction. Suppose the super-replication theorem with
e− 1 options holds with g = fˆe:
πˆe−1(g) := inf
{
y : y +
e−1∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + (H ◦X)T ≥ g, P̂int-q.s., ℓ ∈ R
e−1, H ∈ H
}
= sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e−1,ϕ
EQ̂[g], (4.39)
and we shall pass to e. By the no arbitrage condition (3.15), there is no H ∈ H, ℓ1, · · · , ℓe−1 and
ℓe ∈ {−1, 1} such that
∑e−1
i=1 ℓifˆi+(H◦X)T ≥ −ℓefˆe, P̂int-q.s. It follows that πˆe−1(fˆe), πˆe−1(−fˆe) >
0, which, by [15, Lemma 3.12] and (4.39), implies that there is Q̂−, Q̂+ ∈ Q̂∗e−1,ϕ such that
−πˆe−1(−fˆe) < E
Q̂− [fˆe] < 0 < E
Q̂+ [fˆe] < πˆe−1(fˆe). (4.40)
In particular, we have
0 ∈ ri{ EQ̂[fˆe], Q̂ ∈ Q̂
∗
e−1,ϕ}. (4.41)
Then we can argue line by line as [14, Proof of Theorem 3.1(case e ≥ 1)] to prove that
there exists a sequence
(
Q̂n
)
n≥1
⊂ Q̂∗e,ϕ s.t. E
Q̂n [g]→ πˆe(g),
which shows that
sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
EQ̂[g] ≥ πˆe(g).
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To conclude, it is enough to notice that the reverse inequality is the classical weak duality which
can be easily obtained from [15, Lemmas A.1 and A.2].
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (case e ≥ 1). Notice that (4.36) has been proved for the case e = 0
in Section 4.2, although the formulations are slightly different. The proof is still based on the
induction as in the proof of [3, Theorem 2.2]. Let us assume that (4.36) holds for e− 1 ≥ 0 and
then prove it for the case of e. Define
J : Q̂∗e−1,ϕ × R→ R, (Q̂, β) 7→ E
Q̂[g] + βEQ̂[fˆe]−H(Q̂, P̂int).
Clearly, J is concave in the first argument and convex in the second argument. By (4.41), J
satisfies the compactness-type condition (14) in [3], thus we can apply the minimax theorem.
Using the induction hypothesis and the same arguments as in [3], we have
inf
(H,ℓ)∈H×Re
sup
P̂∈P̂int
logEP̂
[
exp
(
g +
e∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + (H ◦X)T
)]
= inf
β∈R
min
(H,ℓ)∈H×Re−1
sup
P̂∈P̂int
EP̂
[
exp
(
g +
e−1∑
i=1
ℓifˆi + βfˆe + (H ◦X)T
)]
= inf
β∈R
sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e−1,ϕ
J(Q̂, β) (4.42)
= sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e−1,ϕ
inf
β∈R
J(Q̂, β) = sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
(
EQ̂[g]−H(Q̂, P̂int)
)
.
The duality holds as a consequence. Moreover, from (15) of [3], ∀c < infβ∈R supQ̂∈Q̂∗e−1,ϕ
J(Q̂, β),
∃n, s.t. for all β satisfying |β| > n, sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e−1,ϕ
J(Q̂, β) > c. Thus (4.42) can be rewritten as
inf
|β|≤n
sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e−1,ϕ
J(Q̂, β).
Now the lower-continuity of β 7→ sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
J(Q̂, β) implies the existence of some βˆ such that
sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
J(Q̂, βˆ) = inf
β∈R
sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e,ϕ
J(Q̂, β).
Combining βˆ with the optimal strategy with e − 1 options (Hˆ, ℓˆ⋆), we deduce the existence of
an optimal strategy for e options, namely (Hˆ, ℓˆ) := (Hˆ, (ℓˆ⋆, βˆ)). Using the construction (2.8),
one can obtain (ηˆ, ℓˆ) explicitly attaining the infimum in (3.17) from (Hˆ, ℓˆ) which is constructed
already in previous steps.
4.4 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Using the expression in (3.20), one has
lim
γ→∞
πγ(ξ) = lim
γ→∞
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
,
where the r.h.s. is increasing in γ. Replacing the limit by supremum, and then interchanging
the order of two supremums, we have
lim
γ→∞
πγ(ξ) = sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
sup
γ
{
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
−
1
γ
E(Q,P)
}
= sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
.
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By similar arguments as in Section 3.2 of [14], we can reformulate the problem at the r.h.s. on
the enlarged space Ω̂ and then use Lemma 4.12 to obtain that
sup
(Q,Z)∈S∗e
EQ
[
ξ · ZT
]
= sup
Q̂∈Q̂∗e
EQ̂
[
ξ ·XT
]
= π(ξ).
This concludes the proof.
A Appendix : Exponential utility maximization duality
without transaction cost
In this appendix, we shall present an auxiliary result on the exponential utility maximization
problem without transaction cost by applying the same procedure as in the proof of Theorem
3.1. This allows to extend the main results in Bartl [3] without a restrictive ω-wise no-arbitrage
condition. Moreover, an auxiliary result in the dominated case consists a key ingredient in the
proof of our main result in Theorem 3.1 with transaction cost (in particular in Lemma 4.11).
Throughout this appendix, we stay in the context of Section 2.1, where Ω := ΩT1 is a
(product) Polish space with the raw canonical filtration F0 = (F0t )0≤t≤T and the universally
completed filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T and F := FT . The space (Ω,F) is equipped with a family of
(possibly) non-dominated probability measures P defined by (2.1) with a given family of classes
of probability measures Pt(ω) on Ω1, that is,
P :=
{
P := P0 ⊗ P1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ PT−1 : Pt(·) ∈ Pt(·) for t ≤ T − 1
}
,
which satisfies the measurability condition (2.2). We take the F0-adapted process (St)0≤t≤T in
(2.4) and let it represent the discounted stock price, which can be traded without any transaction
cost. Finally, by a slight abuse of language, we denote g : Ω→ R an upper semi-analytic random
variable representing the payoff of a derivative option, and let
H := {All F-predictable processes}
represent the set of all admissible trading strategies, and denote (H◦S)T :=
∑T
t=1Ht ·(St+1−St).
Following Bouchard and Nutz [15], we define the quasi-sure no-arbitrage condition NA(P) by
(H ◦ S)T ≥ 0, P-q.s. =⇒ (H ◦ S)T = 0, P-q.s. for all H ∈ H. (A.43)
Further, for each t = 0, · · · , T −1 and ωt ∈ Ωt, we define the no-arbitrage condition NA(Pt(ωt))
by
h ·∆St+1(ω
t, ·) ≥ 0, Pt(ω
t)-q.s. =⇒ h ·∆St+1(ω
t, ·) = 0, Pt(ω
t)-q.s. for all h ∈ Rd. (A.44)
Recall also that (by Lemma 4.6 of [15]) the set Nt = {ωt ∈ Ωt : NA(Pt(ωt)) fails} is P-polar if
NA(P) holds.
Let us denote by Q0 the collection of measures Q ∈ B(Ω) such that Q≪ P and S is an
(F,Q)-martingale. Then given a universally measurable random variable ϕ : Ω→ R+, we define
Q∗0 :=
{
Q ∈ Q0 : E
Q
[
g−
]
+ E(Q,P) <∞
}
and Q∗ϕ := {Q ∈ Q
∗
0 : E
Q[ϕ] < +∞}.
Theorem A.1. Let g : Ω→ (−∞,+∞] be upper semi-analytic and suppose that NA(P) holds.
Then for any universally measurable ϕ : Ω→ R+, one has
V := inf
H∈H
sup
P∈P
logEP
[
exp
(
g + (H ◦ S)T
)]
= sup
Q∈Q∗ϕ
{
EQ[g]− E(Q,P)
}
.
Moreover, the infimum over H ∈ H is attained by some optimal trading strategy Hˆ.
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Remark A.2. In Bartl [3], the above result is proved under the condition that NA(Pt(ωt)) holds
for all t = 0, · · · , T−1 and all ωt ∈ Ωt. As explained in Remark 2.5 of [3], the main reason to use
this ω-wise no-arbitrage condition (rather than the quasi-sure no-arbitrage condition NA(P)) is
the measurability issue due to their dynamic programming procedure. Our alternative procedure
allows to overcome this measurability difficulty.
A.1 Some technical lemmas
In this section, we shall give some technical lemmas which will be used in both Section A.2 and
Section A.3. Firstly, by using the same arguments as in Lemma 4.4, one obtains the next weak
duality.
Lemma A.3. Under the same conditions as Theorem A.1, one has
inf
H∈H
sup
P∈P
logEP
[
exp
(
g + (H ◦ S)T
)]
≥ sup
Q∈Q∗
0
{
EQ[g]− E(Q,P)
}
.
Next, for all t ∈ {0, · · · , T − 1}, we consider an upper semi-analytic function gt+1 : Ωt+1 →
R ∪ {∞}, and define
gt(ω
t) := sup
Q∈Q∗
0
(t,ωt)
{
EQ[gt+1]− E
(
Q,Pt(ω
t)
)}
, for all ωt ∈ Ωt,
where
Q∗0(t, ω
t) :=
{
δωt ⊗Q ∈ B(Ωt+1) : Q≪ Pt(ω
t), EQ
[
St+1(ω
t, ·)− St(ω
t)
]
= 0,
EQ
[
g−t+1(ω
t, ·) + |St+1(ω
t, ·)− St(ω
t)|
]
+ E
(
Q,Pt(ω
t)
)
<∞
}
.
Further, given a universally measurable random variable Yt+1 : Ωt+1 → R+, we introduce
Q∗Yt+1(t, ω
t) :=
{
Q ∈ Q∗0(t, ω
t) : EQ[Yt+1(ω
t, ·)] <∞
}
.
Moreover, for any universally measurable random variable Yt : Ωt → R+, we denote
Q∗Yt,t := {Q ∈ Q0|Ωt : E
Q[g−t ] + E(Q,P) < +∞, E
Q[Yt] < +∞}.
Lemma A.4. For any universally measurable random variable Yt+1 : Ωt+1 → R+, one has
gt(ω
t) = sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt+1
(t,ωt)
{
EQ[gt+1]− E
(
Q,Pt(ω
t)
)}
, P-q.s.
In addition, if Yt+1 is assumed to be Borel measurable, the graph set[[
Q∗Yt+1(t)
]]
:=
{
(ω,Q) : ω ∈ Ωt,Q ∈ Q
∗
Yt+1(t, ω)
}
is analytic.
Proof. The first result is consequent on the one-period duality result in Theorem 3.1 of Bartl
[3] (see also our Remark 4.8), and the second result follows essentially the same arguments as
in the proof of Lemma 4.9.
Lemma A.5. Assume that NA(P) holds true. Then gt is upper semi-analytic, and there exists
a universally measurable map ht+1 : Ωt → Rd, together with a P-polar set N ⊂ Ωt such that,
for all ω ∈ N c, one has
gt(ω
t) = sup
P∈Pt(ωt)
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1(ω
t, ·) + ht+1(ω
t)(St+1(ω
t, ·)− St(ω
t))
)]
> −∞.
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Proof. The argument is similar to Lemma 4.10, so we shall provide here a sketch of the proof. As
gt+1 is upper semi-analytic,
[[
Q∗0(t)
]]
is analytic from Lemma A.4 and (ωt,Q) ∈ Ωt×B(Ω1) 7→
−E(Q,Pt(ω
t)) is upper semi-analytic by [3, Lemma 4.2] and [11, Proposition 7.47], it follows
from Lemma A.4 and a measurable selection argument(see e.g. [11, Proposition 7.26, 7.47, 7.48])
that ωt 7→ gt is upper semi-analytic. By defining
V ∗t (ω
t) := inf
ht+1∈Rd
sup
P∈Pt(ωt)
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1(ω
t, ·) + ht+1(St+1(ω
t, ·)− St(ω
t))
)]
,
and applying Theorem 3.1 of [3], we obtain that
gt(ω
t) = V ∗t (ω
t) > −∞, if NA(Pt(ω
t)) holds true.
As NA(P) holds, this is valid outside a P-polar set N .
By defining φt(ω
t, ht+1) := supP∈Pt(ωt) logE
P
[
exp
(
gt+1(ω
t, ·)+ht+1(St+1(ωt, ·)−St(ωt))
)]
,
we can argue similarly as Lemma 4.10 to see that (ωt, ht+1) 7→ φt is in Ft ⊗B(R
d). Let us now
consider the random set
Φ(ωt) := {h ∈ Rd : φ(ωt, h) = gt(ω
t)}.
The previous arguments yield that [[Φ]] is in Ft ⊗ B(Rd). Thus by Lemma 4.11 of [15], Φ
admits an Ft-measurable selector ht+1 on the universally measurable set Φ(ωt) 6= ∅. Moreover,
Theorem 3.1 of [3] implies that Φ(ωt) 6= ∅ holds true outside a P-polar set N , thus ht+1 solves
the infimum P-q.s.
A.2 Proof of Theorem A.1 in a dominated case
We first provide the proof of Theorem A.1 in a dominated case, where P is a singleton, i.e.
P = {P}, for P = P0⊗ P1⊗ · · · ⊗ PT−1, where Pt(ωt) ∈ Pt(ωt) for all ωt ∈ Ωt and all t ≤ T − 1.
In particular, Pt : Ωt → B(Ωt+1) is a regular conditional probability distribution(r.c.p.d.) of P
knowing F0t . We can assume without loss of generality that Pt(ω
t) = {Pt(ωt)}. Moreover, let
FPt denote the P-completion of the σ-field Ft, then any F
P
t -measurable random variable can be
modified to a Borel measurable random variable in sense of P-a.s.
The following lemma is an analogue of Lemma 4.11, and in this dominated context, the
measurability issue is much easier to treat.
Lemma A.6. Assume the same conditions in Theorem A.1 and that P = {P}. Then for all
t ≤ T − 1 and all FPt+1-measurable random variable Yt+1 : Ωt+1 → R+, there is a Borel random
variable Yt : Ωt → R+ such that
sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt,t
{
EQ[gt]− E(Q,P|Ωt)
}
≤ sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt+1,t+1
{
EQ[gt+1]− E(Q,P|Ωt+1)
}
. (A.45)
Proof. Under the reference probability P, for any FPt+1-measurable random variable Yt+1,
there exists a Borel measurable random variable Y ∗t+1, such that Yt+1 = Y
∗
t+1,P-a.s. and thus
EQ[Yt+1] = E
Q[Y ∗t+1], for all Q ∈ Q
∗
Yt+1,t+1
. So we can assume w.l.o.g. that Yt+1 is Borel mea-
surable. By Lemma A.4 together with a measurable selection argument (see e.g. Proposition
7.50 of [11]), for any ε > 0, there exists a universally measurable kernel Qεt (·) : Ωt → B(Ω1)
such that δω ⊗Qεt (ω) ∈ Q
∗
Yt+1
(t, ω) for all ω ∈ Ωt, and
gt(ω) ≤ E
δω⊗Q
ε
t (ω)[gt+1]− E
(
Qεt (ω),Pt(ω)
)
+ ε.
The rest arguments are almost the same as in Step (ii) of the proof of Lemma 4.11 and we shall
omit the details.
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Proof of Theorem A.1 when P = {P}. We can argue by induction as in the proof of
Proposition 4.2. Noticing NA({P}) holds, the case T = 1 is proved by Theorem 3.1 of [3].
Suppose the case T = t is verified with optimal strategy Hˆ := (Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆt):
logEP
[
exp(gt + (Hˆ ◦ S)t
)]
= sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P|Ωt
)}
, (A.46)
and we shall pass to the T = t + 1 case. Denoting gt+1 := g, defining Hˆt+1(ω
t) := ht+1 as in
Lemma A.5, setting Yt+1 := ϕ for any universally measurable random variable ϕ : Ω → R+,
and letting Yt be given as in Lemma A.6, it follows that
sup
Q∈Q∗ϕ
{
EQ[gt+1]− E(Q,P|Ωt+1)
}
≥ sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P|Ωt
)}
= logEP
[
exp(gt + (Hˆ ◦ S)t
)]
= logEP0⊗···⊗Pt−1
[
exp
(
logEPt
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦ S)t+1
)])]
= logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦ S)t+1
)]
≥ inf
H∈H
logEP [exp (gt+1 + (H ◦ S)t+1)] ,
where the first inequality follows by Lemma A.6 and the third line follows by Lemma A.5. As
the reverse inequality is the weak duality by Lemma A.3, we have proved the case T = t + 1.
In particular, (Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆt, Hˆt+1) is the optimal trading strategy for the case T = t+ 1.
The following corollary serves as an important technical step in the proof of Lemma 4.11.
Corollary A.7. Assume the same conditions in Theorem A.1 and let P ∈ P be fixed. Then for
any universally measurable random variables g : Ω → R and ϕ : Ω → R+, and any Q∗ ∈ Q∗0,
one has
EQ
∗
[g]− E
(
Q∗,P
)
≤ sup
Q∈Q∗ϕ
{
EQ[g]− E
(
Q,P
)}
. (A.47)
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that E(Q∗,P) < ∞. In this case, one has
Q∗ ≪ P and the classical no-arbitrage condition NA({Q∗}) holds. Let us denote
Q∗∗ϕ := {Q ∈ Q
∗
ϕ : E(Q,Q
∗) < +∞},
Using the weak duality of Lemma A.3 and applying Theorem A.1 ( in the context of the fixed
probability space (Ω,F ,Q∗)), we have
EQ
∗
[g]− E
(
Q∗,P
)
= EQ
∗
[
g − log
dQ∗
dP
]
− E(Q∗,Q∗)
≤ inf
H∈H
logEQ
∗
[
exp
(
g − log
dQ∗
dP
+ (H ◦X)T
)]
= sup
Q∈Q∗∗ϕ
(
EQ
[
g − log
dQ∗
dP
]
− E (Q,Q∗)
)
≤ sup
Q∈Q∗ϕ
(
EQ
[
g − log
dQ∗
dP
]
− E (Q,Q∗)
)
= sup
Q∈Q∗ϕ
(
EQ[g]− E (Q,P)
)
.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem A.1
We now provide the proof of Theorem A.1 in the general (possibly) non-dominated case.
Lemma A.8. Let t+1 ≤ T , then for any universally measurable random variable Yt+1 : Ωt+1 →
R+ and ε > 0, there is a universally measurable random variable Y
ε
t : Ωt → R+ such that
sup
Q∈Q∗
Y ε
t
,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P|Ωt
)}
≤ sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt+1,t+1
{
EQ[gt+1]− E
(
Q,P|Ωt+1
)}
+ ε. (A.48)
Proof. In view of Corollary A.7, we can assume w.l.o.g. that Yt+1 ≡ 0. By Lemma A.4 and a
measurable selection argument (see e.g. Proposition 7.50 of [11]), for any ε > 0, there exists a
universally measurable kernel Qεt (·) : Ωt → B(Ω1) such that δω ⊗ Q
ε
t (ω) ∈ Q
∗
Yt+1
(t, ω) for all
ω ∈ Ωt, and
gt(ω) ≤ E
δω⊗Q
ε
t (ω)[gt+1]− E
(
Qεt (ω),Pt(ω)
)
+ ε.
The rest argument is similar to Step (ii) of the proof of Lemma 4.11, and we omit it here.
Proof of Theorem A.1. Notice that under NA(P), the results in case T = 1 follows from The-
orem 3.1 of [3]. Suppose that when T = t the duality holds with optimal strategy (Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆt).
Denoting gt+1 := g, defining Hˆt+1(ω
t) := ht+1 as in Lemma A.5, setting Yt+1 := ϕ and letting
Yt be given in Lemma A.8, we apply similar argument as in the dominated context in Section
A.2 to obtain
sup
Q∈Q∗ϕ
{
EQ[gt+1]− E(Q,P|Ωt+1)
}
≥ sup
Q∈Q∗
Yt,t
{
EQ[gt]− E
(
Q,P|Ωt
)}
= sup
P∈P
logEP
[
exp(gt + (Hˆ ◦ S)t
)]
≥ sup
P∈P
logEP
[
exp
(
gt+1 + (Hˆ ◦ S)t+1
)]
≥ inf
H∈H
sup
P∈P
logEP [exp (gt+1 + (H ◦ S)t+1)] .
This together with Lemma A.3 implies the duality result. Moreover, (Hˆ1, · · · , Hˆt+1) is the
optimal trading strategy for the case T = t+ 1.
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